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Activities that remove CO2 from the atmosphere and store it in forest and 
agricultural ecosystems can generate CO2-offset credits that can thus substitute for CO2 
emissions reduction. Are biological CO2-uptake activities competitive with CO2 offsets 
from reduced fossil fuel use? In this paper, it is argued that transaction costs impose a 
formidable obstacle to direct substitution of carbon uptake offsets for emissions reduction 
in trading schemes, and that separate caps should be set for emissions reduction and sink-
related activities. While a tax/subsidy scheme is preferred to emissions trading for 
incorporating biologically-generated CO2
JEL Categories: Q54, Q23, Q42, H23, D23
 offsets, contracts that focus on the activity and 
not the amount of carbon sequestered are most likely to lead to the lowest transaction 
costs.  
 
Keywords:   carbon sequestration; transaction costs; climate change 
 
   1 
Biological Carbon Sinks: Transaction Costs and Governance 
By removing CO2 from the atmosphere, activities to sequester carbon and create 
biological carbon sinks have long been considered an important aspect of any attempts to 
address anthropogenic climate change. However, implementing policy to bring biological 
sinks into an international agreement to reduce greenhouse gases, specifically the Kyoto 
Accord, has turned out to be both difficult and controversial. There have been a number 
of reasons for this, including questions regarding ‘additionality’ (whether a sink activity 
would have been undertaken without concerns about global warming), leakages (tree 
planting in one region is offset by greater harvests in other regions as the additional 
plantings lead to lower timber prices), measurement and monitoring (to ensure that stated 
amounts of carbon are actually sequestered), permanence of sinks and responsibility for 
maintaining them after a commitment period, and equivalency of CO2 credits from sink 
activities and emissions reduction. In a companion paper (van Kooten 2008), I examine 
questions concerning additionality, leakages and the value of temporary versus 
permanent CO2-offset credits. In the current paper, I focus on two often neglected issues 
related to the creation of biological sinks – transaction costs and governance – and 
thereby on the role of sinks in a true cap-and-trade system. Although high transaction 
costs and the inability to govern carbon sinks (especially in developing countries) make 
them a generally unattractive option in the arsenal to combat climate change, they are too 
important to neglect entirely. As a result, I conclude by providing an alternative means of 
addressing biological sinks that lowers the transaction costs and might be acceptable in a 
domestic or international CO2-offset trading system.   2 
Background 
The main focus of efforts to mitigate climate change is on the avoidance of CO2 
emissions associated with the burning of fossil fuels, although in lieu of this the Kyoto 
Protocol permits certain activities, such as tree planting and changes in agricultural land 
use, that remove CO2 from the atmosphere and store it in biological sinks. Emissions 
reduction and carbon sequestration are not equivalent activities, however, nor can a CO2-
offset generated by avoiding emissions be considered the same as one obtained by 
sequestering carbon in a biological sink. Therefore, it is not directly relevant to compare 
land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) activities as defined under Kyoto with 
emissions reductions as an alternative means of creating CO2
There is no doubt that tree planting and silvicultural investments that enhance tree 
growth remove CO
-offset credits, primarily 
because of the temporary and uncertain nature of carbon sinks versus emissions 
reduction. Sequestered carbon can be released from a forest sink, for example, as a result 
of early harvest (if economic incentives warrant doing so) or as a result of wildfire, 
disease and/or pests (viz., mountain pine beetle infestation).Various attempts have been 
made to relate sink-generated offsets and emissions reduction in a way that facilities 
trades between them, but none can be considered entirely satisfactory. Therefore, it is 
probably best to separate the two types of activities, as argued below.  
2 from the atmosphere and store the carbon in biomass. But are such 
activities competitive with emissions reduction? Are they financially attractive? To 
answer these questions requires information about the financial costs and carbon-uptake 
benefits of forest-sector activities in various regions. If there are many studies that 
provide this information, they can be analyzed using meta-regression analysis (see van   3 
Kooten et al. 2004).  
A recent meta-regression analysis of the costs of sequestering carbon in forest 
sinks by van Kooten et al. (2007) indicates that, if one assumes sink activities are to 
compete with emissions reduction – that CO2 offsets will trade in markets – at $50 per 
tonne CO2 (t CO2), tree planting and other forest management activities are economically 
attractive. The meta-regression analysis is based on 68 studies with a total of 1047 
observations, with a summary of results provided in Table 1. If the opportunity cost of 
land is appropriately taken into account, forest management and forest conservation 
cannot be seen as economically attractive activities. Assuming emissions reduction 
credits can be purchased for $50 per t CO2 or less, tree planting appears to be attractive 
only in the tropics, although there are clearly projects in other regions of the world where 
they are attractive if harvested trees are used for fuel in lieu of fossil fuels (reducing CO2
Van Kooten et al. (2004, 2007) considered many more studies than the 68 
included in their final meta-regression analyses, but these failed to provide sufficient 
information to calculate the costs and benefits of carbon uptake. As an example of the 
inconsistency with which cost and carbon uptake data are reported, see the review of 
forestry projects conducted by the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO 2004). 
Even for studies included in the meta-regression analysis, many left out details 
concerning the time profile of carbon uptake, which van Kooten (2008) shows to be 
highly relevant. Importantly, studies also failed to take into account transaction costs. 
 
emissions). Europe might be an exception because the opportunity costs of land are 
simply too high, although even in that region there might exist some marginal lands 
where tree planting for bio-energy might be feasible.   4 
Overall, one cannot be confident that the values provided in Table 1 are not a gross 
underestimate of the actual costs of generating sink-based CO2 offsets.  
Table 1: Marginal Costs of Creating CO2-Offset Credits through Forestry, Meta-
regression Analysis Results ($/tCO2
 
) 
Study Averages  All observations 
Region and Scenario  (n=68)  (n=1047) 
Global  $28.85  $25.10 
Planting   $0.26  -$4.93 
Planting & opportunity cost of land   $29.80  $21.91 
Planting, opportunity cost of land & fuel substitution  -$40.14  $19.88 
Forest management  $88.47  $35.31 
Forest management & opportunity cost of land  $118.01  $62.15 
Forest management, opportunity cost of land & fuel 
substitution 
$48.07  $60.12 
Forest conservation  $158.28  $20.16 
Forest conservation & opportunity cost of land  $187.82  $47.00 
Europe  $173.26  $183.64 
Planting & opportunity cost of land   $185.44  $180.14 
Planting, opportunity cost of land & fuel substitution  $115.50  $178.11 
Forest management & opportunity cost of land  $273.65  $220.38 
Forest management, opportunity cost of land & fuel 
substitution 
$203.71  $218.35 
Tropics (CDM Projects)  -$26.20  $4.04 
Planting & opportunity cost of land  -$25.26  $0.85 
Planting, opportunity cost of land & fuel substitution  -$95.20  -$1.18 
Forest management & opportunity cost of land  $62.95  $41.09 
Forest management, opportunity cost of land & fuel 
substitution 
-$6.99  $39.06 
Conservation  $103.22  -$0.90 
Conservation & opportunity cost of land  $132.76  $25.94 
Boreal Region  $58.01  $8.77 
Planting & opportunity cost of land  $70.19  $5.26 
Planting, opportunity cost of land & fuel substitution  $0.25  $3.23 
Forest management & opportunity cost of land  $158.40  $45.50 
Forest management, opportunity cost of land & fuel 
substitution 
$88.46  $43.47 
Source: van Kooten et al. (2007). 
 
 
In addition to forest ecosystem sinks, agricultural activities that lead to enhanced 
soil organic carbon and/or more carbon stored in biomass can be used to claim offset 
credits. Compared to forestry activities, those in agriculture provide only very temporary   5 
CO2 offsets. Although agricultural activities such as conservation and zero tillage 
practices, and conversion of cropland to pasture, received quite a bit of attention in the 
early 2000s as another source of revenue for farmers, subsequent policies favouring 
biofuels essentially removed many incentives that CO2
Transaction Costs 
-offset trading might provide 
farmers. The benefits to landowners of growing bio-energy crops generally exceeded 
those of practicing conservation tillage.  
Transaction costs refer to the costs of measuring, monitoring, enforcing and 
negotiating trades, while governance structures are the means by which trades are made. 
Both are affected by the institutional framework that exists in a country or, in the case of 
international trading, by the nature of agreements between independent jurisdictions. 
Included in the institutional framework are such things as social capital, rule of law 
(independence of the judiciary) and freedom to engage in trade, while international 
agreements rely primarily on trust and the ability of one or more parties to an agreement 
to make credible threats should other parties not comply. The ability to impose credible 
threats on Kyoto-ratifying countries that fail to meet their obligations is pretty well non-
existent – the offending state is required to reduce emissions even further than it would 
otherwise in a future, unspecified commitment period. It is at the individual country level, 
or at the level of a bloc such as the European Union, that one is most likely to encounter 
credible offset trading schemes that involve biological sinks. For example, the EU’s 
emission trading system (ETS) permits the use of offset credits from LULUCF projects, 
including projects in developing countries as permitted under Kyoto’s Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM).   6 
The effect of transaction costs can be illustrated with the aid of Figure 1. For 
simplicity, assume we are only interested in the sales of temporary or biological sink 
CO2-offset credits so that S refers to the supply and D to the demand for sink offset 
credits. In the absence of transaction costs, market equilibrium occurs where Q* offsets 
are sold. As shown by Bovenberg (2002), transaction costs occur on both sides of the 
market, with respect to purchasers of offset credits and suppliers. For the current 
purposes, we consider only the supply side. In Figure 1, transaction costs cause the 
supply curve to shift upwards to S′ with equilibrium sales now equal to Q**. Importantly, 
the price of biological sink credits has risen, implying that large industrial firms that need 
to offset emissions will shift purchases toward emission reduction offsets rather than sink 
offset credits. The total transaction costs amount to area a+b+c+d, but there is also a cost 
equal to area e+g that constitutes the loss to society because some transactions are 
crowded out – emitters wishing to purchase offset credits must seek a more expensive 
means to meet emission reduction targets.  
Are transaction costs a significant obstacle to the use of CO2
 
-offsets generated by 
biological sinks? Relevant research reported by Slangen et al. (2008, pp.204-205) 
indicates that these amount to one-quarter or more of the costs of providing nature 
services. Since transaction costs were ignored in the meta-regression results reported in 
Table 1, it is clear that transaction costs make biological sinks a lot less attractive, with 
forestry projects in the tropics (essentially via the CDM) and perhaps some fuel 
substitution projects in the boreal region left as the only options capable of competing 
with emissions reduction.    7 
Transactions
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Figure 1: The effect of transaction costs on trade in CO2
Governance: Carbon Sinks with Cap and Trade in Emissions 
 offsets generated by biological 
activities 
Biological CO2 offsets pose a problem for emission trading schemes as it is 
difficult to compare and smoothly trade off temporary sink offsets against emissions 
reduction. The problem that the authority faces can be illustrated using Figures 2 and 3. 
In the figures we treat emissions abatement as the difference between actual (current) 
CO2
In Figure 2, we assume that, after correcting for the ‘exchange rate’ between 
temporary and permanent CO
 emissions and targeted emissions, with a cap on economy-wide emissions showing 
up as a required target.  
2 offsets, the marginal costs of carbon uptake (thin solid   8 
line) lie below those of emissions reduction (dashed line) over some range, but that there 
is an overall limit to annual (and total) sequestration in biological sinks. The total 
marginal cost of abatement curve (thick solid line) is simply the horizontal sum of the 
separate marginal cost curves. It is kinked at the point where MCSink equals the lowest 
point on (vertical axis intercept of) the MCEmission curve (denoted N) and again at the 
point L where the MCSink becomes vertical (beyond which only the MCEmission is relevant 
so that MCTotal runs parallel to it). Between N and L a mix of terrestrial carbon uptake and 
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Figure 2: Marginal costs of carbon uptake and of emissions reduction 
In Figure 3, the total amount by which CO2 emissions must be abated (C*) might 
represent a country’s Kyoto target. Given the MC of abatement function for emissions   9 
reduction as indicated, the price of permits would equal p if only emission allowances 
were considered. Now, the availability of biological sink activities could lead a country to 
exceed its Kyoto emissions reduction target by permitting sink offsets to substitute for 
emissions reduction. In the limit, if there are sufficient domestic and offshore sink offsets 
available, a country could potentially maintain or exceed current levels of emissions and 
comply with emissions reduction targets. This is even more the case for a single large 
emitter. Therefore, it may be necessary to place a cap or target on the use of biological-
sink generated CO2 offsets (set at K in the figures), as well as a target on emissions 
reduction that equals the difference between the overall (Kyoto) targeted emissions 





























 offsets permitted through biological activities (=C*–K in Fig 3).  
 
 
Figure 3: Caps on terrestrial and total carbon: the arbitrage gap   10 
Suppose that the emissions reduction target is set at C*–K, with K<N (see Fig 2). 
Then, given the marginal cost of abatement function MCEmission for emissions (which is 
the same as in Fig 2), and with biological sequestration less costly than emissions 
reduction, the terrestrial option is always chosen over emissions reduction as long as the 
sink target is not reached. Arrows in Figure 3 are used to indicate the direction along 
which costs should increase as a country mitigates its CO2 emissions – this denotes the 
overall marginal cost of abatement function and differs from that in Figure 2.  
If, on the other hand, the sequestration option is more costly everywhere than 
emissions reduction, as suggested by the results in Table 1 (and particularly if transaction 
costs are included), then the biological sink option will not be chosen unless there are 
political reasons for doing so. In that case, setting a target for emissions reduction that is 
less than C* will result in the country (firm) not achieving the desired or targeted amount 
by which it hope to reduce atmospheric CO2
Finally, a domestic carbon-trading scheme will also need to specify limits on the 
use of other Kyoto instruments over and above domestic biological sink offsets. Indeed, 
using the same reasoning as above, limits will also be needed on the credits available 
through Joint Implementation and the CDM. If carbon trading is international in scope, 
caps on various mechanisms for creating credits will be required, at both the country 
.  
Setting a target for biological carbon sequestration could also lead to potential 
political maneuvering. The existence of a gap at point K (the vertical section in the 
abatement function) implies that, unless there is competitive bidding to supply sink-
generated offset credits, a scarcity rent is created and there is room for higher cost 
sequestration projects to push out lower cost ones as a result of rent seeking behaviour.    11 
level and supra-national levels. Further, given the difficulty of comparing tree planting 
and forest conservation programs (see van Kooten 2008; van Kooten and Sohngen 2007), 
it is also wise to set global and domestic caps on the amount of CO2
Discussion 
-offset credits that 
can be earned by preventing deforestation. Otherwise, every woodlot owner will want to 
receive offset credits whenever harvests are postponed for whatever reason. 
One alternative to emissions trading is to employ a tax on CO2 emissions, and 
expand it to include biological sink activities. When marginal abatement costs and/or 
marginal benefits (supply and demand) are uncertain, choosing quantity (the amount by 
which emissions must be reduced) can result in a mistake about the forecasted price that 
firms will have to pay for CO2-offset permits, while a CO2 tax can lead to the ‘wrong’ 
level of emissions reduction – to emissions reduction below the desired level (Weitzman 
1974). Such errors have social costs. If the demand function for emissions reduction is 
relatively steep but damages accumulate only slowly (as is likely the case with climate 
change), the social costs of relying on tradable emission permits are much higher than 
relying on CO2
By expanding a CO
 taxes (Pizer 1997). 
2 tax scheme to include subsidies for carbon uptake, 
biological activities can be included. Activities that release CO2 into the atmosphere are 
taxed according to the amount of CO2 emitted at the time of release, whether as a result 
of fossil fuel burning, cultivating grasslands or felling trees, while activities that remove 
CO2 from the atmosphere (e.g., planting trees or converting land from cultivation to 
pasture) are subsidized in like manner (van Kooten et al. 1995). Since tax revenues will 
almost certainly exceed subsidies for CO2 uptake, the tax/subsidy scheme is self   12 
financing. The only problem with this scheme, which is true of emissions trading as well, 
is that there are transaction costs of monitoring to ensure that offset credits are not 
overstated and CO2 release is not underreported.  
Despite the benefits of carbon taxes, politicians have opted for emissions trading. 
The EU’s emissions trading system requires large emitters to purchase offsets if they fail 
to meet the targets they negotiated. Offsets can be purchased from firms whose emissions 
fall below their target, or from outside the EU through such Kyoto mechanisms as Joint 
Implementation and CDM. In western North America, seven U.S. states and four 
Canadian provinces participate in the Western Climate Initiative, which intends to 
employ a cap-and-trade scheme (Olewiler 2008). Although details remain to be worked 
out, experience with ETS and political expediency suggest that participants will 
eventually opt for something other than true cap-and-trade. True caps on emissions are 
generally not set because a variety of means (tree planting, agricultural activities, CDM, 
etc.) can be used to generate offset credits that allow emitters to exceed their emissions 
cap, in which case we have credit trading and not cap-and-trade. As argued in this paper, 
true cap-and-trade requires, in addition to limits on emissions of CO2 from fossil fuels, 
limits on the CO2
This is not to suggest that biological sinks are unimportant. Rather, subject to 
caveats concerning their integration into an emissions trading scheme if a carbon tax is 
not used, it is necessary to incorporate sink offsets into the CO
-offset credits that can be earned from tree planting, silvicultural 
investments, reduced deforestation, and other LULUCF activities. 
2-mitigation arsenal in the 
least costly manner. Perhaps the easiest way of doing this is to find governance structures 
that minimize transaction costs. One possibility is to ignore the actual amounts of CO2   13 
that are removed from the atmosphere and stored in the biological sink, and focus only on 
the activity. As long as a particular activity (say planting trees and letting them grow) is 
undertaken, credits are issued in each period over the length of the contract according to a 
pre-determined schedule. The schedule is laid out in a contract that also provides for 
penalties should trees be harvested or destroyed by wildfire or pests. Similarly, farmers 
can negotiate a contract that compensates them for practicing no-till agriculture, but then 
penalizes them for reverting back to conventional tillage. In this way, it is unnecessary to 
measure CO2 flux; only land-use activities need to be monitored. Yet, even in these 
circumstances, there will remain unavoidable transaction costs related to negotiation, 
possible re-contracting in the event of unforeseen contingencies, and so on (see Slangen 
et al. 2008, p.204).  
Clearly, uptake and storage of CO2 in biological sinks has scientific merit and 
countries should pursue activities that increase terrestrial CO2. Landowners could benefit 
from higher revenues and higher land prices if they are compensated for sequestering 
carbon. Yet, despite these benefits, effectively integrating carbon sequestration activities 
into a broader policy arsenal for mitigating climate change is likely to continue to prove 
challenging.   14 
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